A decision maker offers a new product to a fixed number of adopters. The decision maker does not know the value of the product while adopters receive some private information about the value. We study how the decision maker may influence learning among adopters by manipulating the launch sequence when both the decision maker and adopters can learn about the product's value from previous adoption decisions.
Introduction
Anecdotal evidence shows that people's decisions are often influenced by others' choices.
Movie goers are easily attracted to movies with big opening box offices; a farmer's decision to adopt a new technology is affected by the number of early adoptions; in presidential elections, a "momentum" effect is well documented. The fact that later adopters may herd on early adopters' choices posts a natural question to a decision maker who wants to maximize the total number of adoptions. Should he ask adopters to decide simultaneously or sequentially?
If a sequential launch is ever preferred, what is the optimal launch sequence? The decision maker could be a firm introducing a new product to many markets, a government promoting a new agriculture technology among farmers, or a health care administrator promoting a new procedure among doctors.
This paper studies how a decision maker should optimally introduce a new product to a fixed number of adopters in the presence of herd behavior. The herd behavior we focus on results from social learning. Adopters have a common value and each receives private information regarding the unknown common value. Early adopters' decisions are based on their private information. As a result, subsequent adopters may infer early adopters' private information from their choices. When the public information swamps an adopter's private information, all the remaining adopters herd on the same action. Initiated by Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) , most existing social learning literature studies how a herd naturally arises when adopters make decisions sequentially in an exogenous order. We argue that a decision maker can influence learning among adopters and hence, the formation of a herd by manipulating the launch sequence. For example, a firm can control whether to allow consumers to learn across markets by choosing between a simultaneous launch in all markets or a sequential launch across markets. Moreover, it can control the amount of information revealed to consumers in the remaining markets. If the firm limits the release only in one market in the first period, consumers in the remaining markets learn very little about the product's value from its first period sales. By contrast, if the firm releases the product in a thousand markets in the first period, its first period sales are a very good indicator for the product's true value.
In our model, the product's value is unknown to adopters and the decision maker. This is because the product's value represents the match between adopters' taste and the underlying characteristics of the product. Each adopter receives a private signal regarding the common value. An adopter's decision is based on his private signal and the choices made by early adopters. The decision maker decides the number of offers to make in each period, contingent on the history of adoption. The cost of adoption is fixed.
Our main results are the following: 1) The decision maker never launches the product sequentially when people's initial assessment of the product is either extremely good or extremely bad. The initial assessment is the prior belief that the product has a high value.
2) When the initial assessment of the product is good but not extremely good, the decision maker will launch it sequentially even though many adopters would have taken the product in a simultaneous launch. 3) When the initial assessment of the product is bad but not extremely bad, the launch decision depends on the ratio of the ex ante expected value to the cost.
Why is a sequential launch never superior to a simultaneous launch when the initial assessment of the product is either extremely good or extremely bad? Suppose the decision maker launches a sure winner sequentially. Early adopters will adopt the product even if they receive bad signals. This is because the extremely good prior belief will dominate an adopter's private signal. Later adopters therefore will infer nothing from the number of early adoptions. Hence, the decision maker cannot increase his total number of adoptions in a simultaneous launch by releasing it sequentially. The same logic applies to the launch of a dud. Specifically, according to the tie-breaking rule the decision maker will offer a sure winner simultaneously to all the adopters, and will not offer a dud to any adopter.
The more interesting case is when adopters have a less extreme initial assessment about the product. Now, the decision maker can increase the number of adoptions by manipulating the launch sequence. How is a sequential launch different from a simultaneous launch? When early adopters' decisions are based on their private information, their decisions will convey the private information. This additional information may change later adopters' minds had they not been allowed to observe the number of previous adoptions. To convince the remaining adopters the product is worth taking, the decision maker needs to ensure that enough adopters have adopted the product, but this depends on whether the product is promising, that is, whether the prior belief that the product has a high value is greater than a half.
When the product is promising, the decision maker will always launch it sequentially in spite of a large demand in a simultaneous launch. This is because early launches are more likely to deliver convincing good news and, hence, induce later adopters with bad signals to adopt it. By contrast, adopters with bad signals will not adopt the product in a simultaneous launch. The optimal number of offers to make in a given period, however, depends on the trade-off between a larger chance of an adoption herd tomorrow, and a smaller benefit from an adoption herd. By the law of large numbers, the more offers the decision maker makes today, the higher the chance to trigger an adoption herd tomorrow. However, since fewer adopters remain tomorrow, the benefit from an adoption herd is smaller. This result provides one explanation for why, sometimes, a well-anticipated product was released in a limited fashion. For example, the popular game console Wii was constantly out of stock during the introduction phase. In the same way, good artistic movies are often released first in New York and Los Angles and then to other cities.
Alternatively, when the product is unpromising, the decision maker will either offer it simultaneously to all adopters or to one adopter first and then to all the remaining adopters.
The launch strategy depends on whether the product is regarded as worth adoption ex ante.
In other words, the decision maker either does not allow adopters to learn from each other's decisions, or allows them to learn the minimum amount of information. This is because early launches are more likely to deliver bad news. The decision maker does not want to risk a rejection herd by revealing too much information.
One interesting implication of the model is that a promising product may have a higher failure rate than an unpromising product. When launching a promising product, the decision maker is confident to reveal a lot of information to seek an adoption herd. If it turns out, however, that very few people adopt the product in the early stage, the decision maker will be trapped in a rejection herd. By contrast, when launching an unpromising product, the decision maker will never reveal much information for fear of a rejection herd. Hence, remaining adopters will never hear bad news damaging enough to kill the product.
We have two other implications about the amount of information revealed during a launch and the launch duration. First, we find that a promising product has a longer launch duration than an unpromising product. Second, the decision maker will reveal more information during the launch of a promising product than that of an unpromising product.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 illustrates the basic idea with a simple model. Section 5 shows the main results. Section 6 discusses applications of the model. Section 7 concludes.
Related Literature
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992), and Banerjee (1992) are the pioneer works in the social learning literature. They show that herds can be rational, and that rational herds may contain very little information. In their models, adopters enter the market one after another in an exogenous order and make adoption decisions based on what they observe. In our model, the decision maker can influence adopter learning by manipulating the launch sequence of the product.
Bose, Orosel, Ottaviani and Vesterlund (2006, 2007) study a model in which a monopolist can affect the information aggregation over time by changing the price. In their model, consumers enter the market one after another in an exogenous order and the monopolist affects consumer learning by setting different prices while facing the trade-off between current rent extraction and future information screening. We further extend this literature by endogenizing the sequence in which consumers arrive. More specifically, in a context where a seller wants to maximize his profit from launching a new product, we allow the seller to influence learning by manipulating the launch sequence rather than the price. The seller's trade-off faced in our model is between the public information generated by earlier markets and the profit gain (loss) in those earlier markets due to their less informed decisions. Sgroi (2002) analyzes the choice of the launch strategy in a context with social learning.
He studies a special case of our problem where the launch sequence is not fully endogenized and there is only a one-sided learning problem. Bergemann and Valimaki (1996 , 1997 , 2000 study various models in which the uncertainty of a product's quality is resolved over time by consumers' experimentations. In our framework, adopters make adoption decisions based on pre-existing (ex-ante) private information.
Finally Bar-Isaac (2003) studies a dynamic learning model where a seller is privately informed about the quality of the product whereas buyers learn the quality of the product over time. By contrast, in our paper, buyers are privately informed about the product's quality and both the seller and buyers learn the quality of the product over time. Besides, Bar-Isaac focuses on the seller's trading decision in each period. Once the seller decides to trade, he will sell to all consumers in that period. In contrast, we focus on the seller's launch decision in each period. The seller not only decides whether to trade but also decides how many offers to make in each period.
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A risk-neutral decision maker would like to offer a new product to N adopters, and he maximizes his payoff by maximizing the number of adoptions. The adopters are indexed by i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N }. The decision maker considers offering the product to these adopters over time, which we take as discrete. The index t ∈ {1, 2, ...} denotes the periods in which the decision maker may offer the product. We say the decision maker offers the product to adopter i in period t. The decision maker will offer the product to an adopter at most once.
If the product is offered to adopter i, the adopter then decides whether to take the product. An adopter's cost of adoption is fixed at c, which is commonly known. Let n t , with n t ∈ {1, 2, ..., N }, denote the number of offers the decision maker makes in period t. The decision maker chooses n t in period t. For example, he may decide to offer the product to adopters 1 to 3 in period 1, and then to adopters 4 to N in period 2. Alternatively, the decision maker may offer the product to one adopter in each period.
The value of the product v is either low or high, v ∈ {L, H}. Without loss of generality, we choose L = 0 and H = 1. The value v is unknown to the decision maker and adopters.
The value may represent the match between the product and adopters' taste. The decision maker does not know adopters' taste, whereas adopters do not know the product's underlying characteristics. In period t, the public belief that the product has a high value is λ t , with λ t ∈ (0, 1). An adopter adopts, at most, one unit of the product. His utility is v − c if he takes the product, and 0 otherwise.
When the product is offered to adopter i, a random signal s i will be generated and be observed by this adopter. This signal remains unknown to others. Conditional on the true value v, signals received by different adopters are independent and identically distributed.
Let s i ∈ {L, H} be the possible values of the signal, where s i = L indicates a "bad" signal, while s i = H indicates a "good" signal, respectively:
where q ∈ (0.5, 1). That is, when adopters receive signal H, the value of the product is more likely to be high than when they receive signal L. The parameter q is common knowledge and is usually called the precision of a signal. Note that q does not depend on i, so the signals are equally precise.
The sequence of events in period t is as follows. First, the decision maker and the remaining adopters observe the decision maker's previous decisions including how many offers he made in each period and the identity of each previous adopter. In addition, they observe the adoption decisions made by previous adopters. Second, the decision maker decides n t , the number of offers to make in period t. Third, if the decision maker offers the product to adopter i, this adopter receives a private signal, s i , about the product's value.
Fourth, an adopter decides whether to take the product when it is offered to him. . An adopter will make a decision at most once, and therefore his decision rule is very simple. When he is offered the opportunity to adopt the product, his decision is a function of the public belief in that period and his private signal. The adopter will adopt the product if and only if his posterior belief is greater than or equal to the cost of adoption.
The decision maker can observe everything that happened in previous periods, but in equilibrium, bases his strategy only on the public belief and the number of the remaining adopters in the current period. Let n * (λ t , N t ) denote the decision maker's equilibrium strategy in period t, and let v(λ t , N t ) denote the decision maker's value function. Given adopters' strategies, n * (λ t , N t ) maximizes the decision maker's expected number of adoptions.
We assume that when the decision maker is indifferent between offering the product to an adopter in the current period and in the future, he will make the offer now. This assumption can be justified by a small waiting cost for the decision maker. We assume that when an adopter will reject the product, the decision maker will not make an offer to the adopter.
This assumption can be justified by a small cost of making the offer.
We define some notation here. Given a prior belief λ, adopter j's posterior belief after receiving a bad signal is
Similarly, the adopter's posterior belief upon receiving a good signal is
Figure 1 characterizes an adopter's posterior beliefs as functions of his prior belief. The concave curve represents λ H (λ) and the convex curve represents λ L (λ). Because the value of the product is v ∈ {0, 1}, the adopter's expected value of the product after receiving a good signal is λ H (λ) and his expected value of the product after receiving a bad signal is λ L (λ).
An Example with Two Adopters
In this section, we use a simple example with two adopters to illustrate when the decision maker prefers a sequential launch to a simultaneous launch, and, if so, how much he gains by a sequential launch. The decision maker's launch strategy critically depends on adopters' prior expectations of the product's value and the cost.
In the example, we drop the subscript t. Let λ denote the prior belief. We divide the discussion into four cases according to the level of the prior belief (see Figure 2 ). The cases are ordered by extremely pessimistic adopters (λ < λ), pessimistic adopters (λ < λ < c), optimistic adopters (c < λ <λ, and extremely optimistic adopters (λ < λ). The decision To begin, we define two threshold beliefs
At belief λ, an adopter is indifferent between taking and rejecting the product upon receiving a good signal; 1 at beliefλ, an adopter is indifferent between taking and rejecting the product upon receiving a bad signal. 
No Launches (λ < λ)
When adopters are extremely pessimistic about the product, the decision maker will never launch the product.
At the prior belief λ, an adopter is indifferent between taking and rejecting the product upon receiving a good signal, i.e., λ H (λ) = c. Since the posterior belief λ H (λ) increases in the prior belief, when an adopter's prior belief is below λ, he will not take the product even if he receives a good signal, i.e., λ H (λ) < c (see Figure 1) . Hence, the decision maker's payoff from a simultaneous launch is zero.
In a sequential launch, the first adopter will always reject the product. The second adopter therefore cannot infer any information from the first adopter's decision. Consequently, the decision maker's payoff from the sequential launch is the same as the simultaneous launch.
Preventing a Rejection Herd(λ < λ < c)
Pessimistic adopters think the product is not worth adoption before receiving any additional information. When the product is offered to an adopter, he will take it if and only if his signal is good, i.e., λ L (λ) < c < λ H (λ) (see Figure 1 ). The decision maker will launch the product simultaneously to prevent a rejection herd.
A sequential launch differs from a simultaneous launch in the second adopter's decision.
This is because in a sequential launch the first adopter's decision conveys his private information. Hence, the second adopter's decision is based on the first adopter's decision and his own private signal.
If the second adopter receives a bad signal, the decision maker's expected payoff in a sequential launch is the same as in a simultaneous launch. This is because in a sequential launch, at best, the second adopter will observe an adoption by the first adopter and hence infer the first adopter receives a good signal. Since both adopters' signals are equally precise, the first adopter's good signal will cancel the second adopter's bad signal, and the second adopter again holds his prior belief. 3 Because the product is regarded as not worth adoption ex ante, the second adopter will not take it.
Alternatively, if the second adopter receives a good signal, a sequential launch differs from a simultaneous launch only when the first adopter receives a bad signal. Specifically, the decision maker loses q(1 − q) from a sequential launch, where q(1 − q) is the probability that the first adopter receives a bad signal and the second adopter receives a good signal. In a sequential launch, if the second adopter observes a rejection by the first adopter, he will not adopt the product even if his own signal is good. This is again because the bad signal received by the first adopter cancels the good signal received by the second adopter. When the product is regarded as not worth adoption ex ante, a little more bad information can easily convince an adopter to reject the product whereas a little more good information is not strong enough to convince him to adopt it.
Seeking an Adoption Herd (c < λ <λ)
If adopters are optimistic, they think the product is worth adoption before receiving any additional information. Again, when the product is offered to an adopter, he will take it if and only if his signal is good (see Figure 1) . In this case, the decision maker will launch the product sequentially to seek an adoption herd.
The analysis is similar to the Preventing a Rejection Herd subsection because the first adopter's decision also conveys his private information. If the second adopter's private signal is bad, a sequential launch differs from a simultaneous launch only when the first adopter receives a good signal; hence, the decision maker gains q(1 − q) from a sequential launch. In a sequential launch, if the second adopter observes an adoption by the first adopter, he will take the product even if his own signal is bad. This is because the product is regarded as worth adoption ex ante.
Alternatively, if the second adopter's private signal is good, the decision maker's expected payoff in a sequential launch is the same as in a simultaneous launch. This is because in a sequential launch, the worst news the second adopter may hear is a rejection by the first adopter. The bad signal conveyed by the rejection will cancel the good signal received by the second adopter and hence the second adopter still thinks the product is worth taking.
When the product is regarded as worth adoption ex ante, a little more bad information is not damaging enough to deter adopters from taking it, whereas a little more good information can easily convince them to adopt the product.
Successfully Capturing All Adopters (λ < λ)
When adopters are extremely optimistic, they think the product is worth adoption even if they receive bad signals, i.e., c < λ L (λ) (see Figure 1) . Hence, if the decision maker launches the product simultaneously, both adopters will take it. The decision maker's payoff is 2.
If the decision maker launches the product sequentially, the first adopter will always take the product. Consequently, the second adopter will infer nothing from the first adoption.
The decision maker's payoff from the sequential launch is the same as the simultaneous launch.
In summary (refer to Figure 2) , the decision maker's launch strategy is not monotone in the prior belief. Specifically, a sequential launch is optimal for the decision maker only when adopters are optimistic but not extremely optimistic about the product. When the product is regarded as not worth adoption ex ante, a rejection by the first adopter can easily trigger a rejection herd. A sequential launch is too risky for the decision maker. In contrast, when adopters think the product is worth adoption ex ante, a sequential launch may trigger an adoption herd but will never trigger a rejection herd. The decision maker therefore prefers a sequential launch to a simultaneous launch. When adopters are extremely optimistic or extremely pessimistic, the first adopter's decision does not convey any information, hence the decision maker does not gain by launching the product sequentially.
While the two-adopter example illustrates the trade-off between sequential and simultaneous launches, new issues arise with more than two adopters. With three or more adopters, the decision maker may find it optimal to offer the product to more than one but less than all adopters, choosing an interior solution to how much information to reveal to future adopters. In addition, the dynamic features of the decision maker's strategy are richer with more adopters.
General Results
Now, we analyze the decision maker's equilibrium strategy in the general case when there are N adopters, where N > 2. When there are more than two adopters, if the decision maker prefers a sequential launch to a simultaneous launch, he needs to decide how much information to reveal. Recall a product is unpromising if λ t < 1 2
; it is promising, otherwise.
Intuitively, if the product is unpromising, the decision maker does not want to take the gamble of allowing adopters to learn more about the product. By contrast, if the product is promising, the decision maker would like to allow adopters to learn more about it. Therefore, unlike the example with two adopters, now the comparison between the public belief λ t and the probability 1 2 plays a role in the analysis.
The decision maker's equilibrium strategy in period t depends on whether the product is regarded as worth taking ex ante, and whether it is promising. We summarize the decision maker's equilibrium strategy in period t, n * (λ t , N t ), by Table 1 . In the table, k and m are natural numbers. The decision maker's choice in period t will determine the distribution of λ t+1 and hence we can derive n t+1 accordingly. 
The above table summarizes what we will show in sections 5.1 and 5.2. Given a pair of (λ t , N t ), we examine n t in subsection 5.1, and we characterize the decision maker's equilibrium strategy in subsection 5.2.
Preliminary Results
In the model, adopters make decisions at most once. When the product is offered to an adopter, his decision does not depend on the number of the remaining adopters. Hence, in period t, if the public belief is above the thresholdλ defined in expression (3), adopters will always adopt the product; if the public belief is below the threshold λ defined in expression (4), adopters will not adopt the product. The analysis is the same as in the example with two adopters.
Lemma 1. Givenλ and λ as defined in (3) and (4), n * (λ t , N t ) = N t if λ t >λ; n * (N t , λ t ) = 0
Next, we analyze the decision maker's strategy when λ < λ t <λ.
Lemma 2. Suppose λ < λ t < min{c,
To see the intuition, suppose the decision maker launches the product to n t adopters, n t < N t . Let ∆ nt denote the difference between the number of adoptions and the number of rejections among the n t adopters. Since signals are equally precise, having observed the adoption decisions made by adopters in period t, the remaining adopters will update their beliefs according to ∆ nt .
If ∆ nt ≥ 2, adopters will update the belief aboveλ and accordingly always adopt the product. If ∆ nt = 1 or ∆ nt = 0, adopters will update their belief to λ H (λ t ), with p < λ H (λ t ) <λ, or hold the same belief λ t , respectively. As a consequence, adopters will adopt the product if and only if they receive a good signal. If ∆ nt ≤ −1, adopters will update their belief below λ and therefore never adopt the product (see Figure 1 ).
The decision maker needs the adoptions to outnumber the rejections by at least two in order to trigger an adoption herd. In contrast, if the rejections outnumber the adoptions just by one, the decision maker will be trapped in a rejection herd. Hence, when adopters
), it is easier for the decision maker to trigger a rejection herd than an adoption herd. Intuitively, when the product is unpromising, allowing adopters to learn from each other's adoption decisions will expose the decision maker to a big risk of a rejection herd while gaining him a small chance of a adoption herd. Hence, the decision maker's optimal strategy is to suppress learning and launch the product simultaneously to all adopters. } < λ t < c and N t > 2, then n * (λ t , N t ) is an even number less than N t .
Given the public belief λ t , λ t ∈ (λ, c), an adopter's decision rule and the rule of triggering an adoption (rejection) herd is the same as in the discussion for Lemma 2.
We first give the intuition for why the decision maker will not launch the product to N t adopters. Let's compare the decision maker's payoff from a simultaneous launch to payoff from a sequential launch where the decision maker launches the product to two adopters in period t and then to the remaining N t − 2 adopters in period t + 1.
In the sequential launch, two adoptions in period t will trigger an adoption herd. One adoption and one rejection in period t will not change the remaining adopters' beliefs. Finally, two rejections will trigger a rejection herd. In the first case, the decision maker gains, relative to a simultaneous launch, from the N t − 2 adopters because of the adoption herd. In the second case, his payoff from the remaining N t − 2 adopters remains the same as with a simultaneous launch because in the sequential launch, the remaining adopters cannot infer anything from previous launches. In the last case, he loses relative to a simultaneous launch from the N t − 2 adopters due to the rejection herd. When λ t > 1 2
, the probability of two adoptions is greater than two rejections in period t. Now, we explain why the decision maker will not launch the product to an odd number of adopters. The decision maker's payoff from launching the product to an odd number of adopters, 2k + 1, is lower than to 2k adopters. When offering the product to adopter j in period t + 1, instead of period t, the decision maker's payoff changes in two ways. First, his expected payoff from adopter j changes because now this adopter's decision is not only based on his private signal but also on the adoption decisions made by previous 2k adopters.
Second, the decision maker's expected payoffs from the remaining N t − 2k − 1 adopters change. This is because reducing one offer in period t will change the probability of herding among the remaining adopters.
, adopter j is more likely to see that the majority of the previous 2k adopters have taken the product. Hence, the decision maker's expected payoff from adopter j increases by delaying the launch. His expected payoffs from the remaining N t − 2k − 1 adopters increases as well. This is because delaying the launch to adopter j from period t to t + 1 will never break an adoption herd among the remaining N t − 2k − 1 adopters but may either trigger an adoption herd or break a rejection herd.
To see this, note that if adopter j has a good signal, delaying the launch to adopter j will reduce the number of adoptions in period t and hence transmit less convincing news to subsequent adopters. However, this change is never damaging enough to break an adoption herd. If the decision maker has triggered an adoption herd by launching the product to the 2k + 1 adopters, the difference ∆ 2k+1 must be at least three. Hence, reducing one offer will, at worst, reduce the difference between the number of adoptions and rejections to two, which will still trigger an adoption herd in period t + 1. The change in launch strategy will reduce the decision maker's payoff earned from the remaining N t − 2k − 1 adopters only in the marginal case where the number of adoptions is more than rejections just by one in period t. In this case the decision maker's loss from the N t − 2k − 1 adopters is
If adopter j has a bad signal, delaying the launch to him from period t to t + 1 will transmit more convincing news to subsequent adopters. This change will greatly increase the decision maker's payoff earned from the remaining N t − 2k − 1 adopters in two marginal cases: ∆ 2k+1 = 1 and ∆ 2k+1 = −1. In the first case, reducing one bad signal will trigger an adoption herd in period t + 1; in the second case, it will break a rejection herd in period t + 1. The gain from launching the product to adopter j in period t + 1 instead of period t outweighs the loss and the decision maker will never launch the product to 2k + 1 adopters, with 1 < 2k + 1.
Lastly, we explain why the decision maker will never launch the product to one adopter in period t. This is because he can always do better by launching the product to two adopters in period t since this will raise the chance of an adoption herd while reducing the chance of a rejection herd.
Lemma 4. Suppose c < λ t < min{λ, 1 2 }, then n * (λ t , N t ) = 1.
To understand the intuition behind Lemma 4, we need to characterize adopters' beliefs updating rules when c < λ t < min{λ, 1 2 }. Suppose the decision maker launches the product to n t adopters, with n t < N t . If ∆ nt ≥ 1, the subsequent adopters will update the belief aboveλ and they will therefore always adopt the product. If ∆ nt = 0 or ∆ nt = −1, the subsequent adopters will not update the belief or update the belief to λ L (λ t ), with λ < λ L (λ t ) < c. Accordingly, they will adopt the product if and only if they receive a good signal. If ∆ nt ≤ −2, the subsequent adopters will update the belief below λ; hence, they will reject the product (see Figure 1 ).
We first give the idea for why allowing the minimum amount of learning, i.e., n * (λ t , N t ) = 1, is more profitable than no learning, i.e., n * (λ t , N t ) = N t . In a simultaneous launch, the decision maker will lose those adopters with a bad signal. In the sequential launch, if the first adopter takes the product, the decision maker will capture the remaining N t −1 adopters even if those adopters receive a bad signal. Although adopters think the product is unpromising, since the cost of adoption is so low, all the remaining adopters will take it after hearing some good news from the first adopter. Now, we give the intuition for why the decision maker does not want adopters to learn more about the product. When λ < , allowing adopters to learn more may, at best, slightly increase the probability of an adoption herd in period t + 1, but will expose him to a larger risk of a rejection herd. Suppose, for example, that λ = 1/4 and q = 2/3. If the decision maker launches the product to one adopter, the probability of triggering an adoption herd is 5/12; the probability of triggering a rejection herd is zero. If the decision maker launches the product to two adopters, the probability of triggering an adoption herd is 7/36; the probability of triggering a rejection herd is 13/36.
Lemma 5. Suppose max{c, 1 2 } < λ t <λ and N t > 2, then n * (λ t , N t ) is an odd number less than N t .
Given the belief λ t , c < λ t <λ, an adopter's decision and the rule of triggering an adoption (rejection) herd is the same as in the discussion for Lemma 4.
First, allowing some learning among adopters is better than no learning. The logic is the same as in the discussion for Lemma 4. Next, the decision maker will never launch the product to an even number, 2k, of adopters. Specifically, he can always do better by launching the product to 2k − 1 adopters in period t. The argument is analogous to that for Lemma 3.
The Equilibrium Strategy
In this subsection we first describe the equilibrium path and then discuss some of the results.
Equilibrium path
Combining Lemmas 2 to Lemma 5, we can summarize the decision maker's equilibrium path induced by the optimal strategy by the following 4 propositions. Propositions 1 to 4 characterize the decision maker's equilibrium path whenλ < ∈ (c,λ) , 1 2 ∈ (λ, c) and
< λ, respectively. Each case is summarized by a diagram.
, the decision maker's equilibrium strategy is the following: (see Figure 3) • n * (λ t , N t ) = 0, ∀λ t ∈ (0, λ)
The decision maker's equilibrium strategy is presented by Figure 3 . Let λ 0 denote the prior belief and N 0 denote the total number of adopters. When λ 0 < λ, Lemma 1 shows that the decision maker will not launch the product. In the following propositions, the decision maker's strategy is the same as here as long as the belief drops below λ.
If the product is unpromising and expensive, i.e., λ < λ 0 < c, a little more bad information conveyed by previous launches may trigger a rejection herd. Hence, the decision maker will suppress learning by launching the product to all adopters in the first period.
If the product is unpromising but cheap, c < λ 0 <λ, the decision maker will allow the minimum amount of learning. This is because a little more good news from the previous launches will convince the remaining adopters to take the product. In contrast, a little more bad information is not damaging enough to deter the remaining adopters from adoption.
To be more specific, the decision maker will launch the product to one adopter in period 1. If the first adopter takes the product, the public belief is updated aboveλ. Then, the decision maker will launch the product to the remaining N 0 − 1 adopters and all of them will adopt the product. Alternatively, if the first adopter rejects the product, the public belief is updated to a level between λ and c. The decision maker again will launch the product to the remaining N 0 − 1 adopters. However, the remaining adopters will take the product if and only if they receive a good signal. The game ends after two periods.
If adopters are extremely optimistic about the product,λ < λ 0 , by Lemma 1, the decision maker will launch the product to all adopters and all of them will take the product. The game ends after the first period. In the following propositions, the decision maker's equilibrium strategy whenλ < λ 0 is the same as here.
Whenλ < 1 2 , the launch period is fairly short and adopters learn very little from each other. In addition, the decision maker will never trigger a rejection herd. <λ, the decision maker's equilibrium strategy is the following: (see Figure 4) • n * (λ t , N t ) = 0, ∀λ ∈ (0, λ)
is the largest odd number less than N t ,
,λ)
• n * (λ t , N t ) = N t , ∀λ t ∈ (λ, 1).
Compared to Proposition 1, the new feature is the case when the product is perceived as cheap and promising, i.e., 1 2 < λ 0 <λ. If the product is cheap and promising, the decision maker will launch the product sequentially to encourage learning. Specifically, by Lemma 5, the decision maker will launch the product to an odd number of adopters, 2k + 1, where 2k +1 < N t . If the number of adoptions is more than rejections by at least one, the adopters' beliefs are updated aboveλ (see Figure 1) . The decision maker will launch the product to all the remaining adopters, and all of them will take it.
If the number of rejections is more than adoption by one, adopters' belief is updated to a level between λ and c. The decision maker again will launch the product to the remaining adopters in period 2, and they will take it if and only if they receive a good signal.
If the number of rejection is more than adoption by at least one, adopters become extremely pessimistic, and the decision maker will not launch the product in period 2.
When adopters believe that the product is cheap and promising, the decision maker may allow more learning. However, it may turn out that the majority of early adopters reject the product, and hence the decision maker may be trapped in a rejection herd. < c, the decision maker's equilibrium strategy is the following: (see Figure 5) • n * (λ t , N t ) = 0, ∀λ ∈ (0, λ)
• n * (λ t , N t ) ∈ {2, 4, 6, ..., N e (N t )}, where N e (N t ) is the largest even number less than N t ,
, c)
is the largest odd number less than N t , ∀λ t ∈ (c,λ)
• n * (λ t , N t ) = N t , ∀λ ∈ (λ, 1).
Compared to Proposition 2, the new scenario is when the product is perceived as promising but expensive, i.e. 1/2 < λ 0 < c. If the product is promising but expensive, the decision maker will encourage learning by launching the product to an even number of adopters in period 1. If more than half the adopters take the product, the public belief is updated abovē λ, and the decision maker will launch the product to all the remaining adopters in period 2. If more than half the adopters reject the product, the public belief is updated below λ, and the decision maker will not launch the product in period 2. If half of the adopters take the product while half of them reject it, the decision maker and the remaining adopters do not learn anything from previous launches. Hence, again, the decision maker will launch the product to an even number of adopters which is not necessarily equal to the previous even number. The decision maker repeats the same pattern until no remaining adopters are left or only one adopter is left.
During the launches, whenever the public belief falls into the range of (1/2, c), the only reason that the decision maker keep launching the product sequentially is because conflicting results happened in the previous period, and hence,the remaining adopters are equally ignorance as in the previous period. As a result, when the product is promising, the launch sequence may exceed two periods. < λ, the decision maker's equilibrium strategy is the following: (see Figure 6) • n * (λ t , N t ) = 0, ∀λ t ∈ (0, λ)
In this case, adopters always think the product is promising. The promising expensive product scenario and the promising cheap product scenario are already discussed in the previous propositions, so we skip the detailed descriptions here.
When the product is promising, the decision maker will always allow some learning among adopters. The launch period will extend more than two periods when at some stage, adopters believe the product is promising but expensive, and they keep seeing the conflicting results from the previous period's launches. Also, there is a positive probability that the product will be rejected by all adopters in the second period.
Discussion
The role of the precision of signals. In our model, the decision maker's ability to influence the learning among adopters is constrained by the precision of signals. Recall, the decision maker can control the information flow from early adopters to later adopters only when people's initial assessment of the product is less extreme, i.e., λ ∈ (λ,λ). The thresholds for an adoption herd,λ, and a rejection herd, λ, however, are determined by the precision of signals, q. Specifically, when signals are more precise, the range (λ,λ) becomes wider, and hence, the decision maker has more power to influence the remaining adopters's decisions. Intuitively, when signals are very precise, early adopters will put more weight on their private information than on the initial assessment of the product when they make adoption decisions. As a result, the remaining adopters are more likely to learn early adopters' private information from their choices. This gives the decision maker more freedom to influence the remaining adopters' decisions by manipulating the launch sequence.
The implication on the failure rate of a new product. One of the interesting results of our model is that a promising product may be trapped in a rejection herd while an unpromising product will never suffer a rejection herd. This implies that a promising product may have a higher chance of suffering a complete failure than an unpromising product because of the decision maker's launch strategies. Let us give an example to illustrate this point.
Suppose there are three adopters in total, the precision of signals is 0.7 and the cost of adoption, c, is 0.65. Consider two new products with different initial assessments. The promising product is believed to have a high value with probability 0.6. The unpromising product is believed to have a high value with probability 0.45. Given this set of parameters, the decision maker will offer the unpromising product simultaneously to all adopters. In contrast, he will offer the promising product to two adopters in the first period and to the remaining adopter in the second period if the first two adopters haven't rejected the product.
According to the decision maker's strategy, the unpromising product will be rejected by all the adopters with probability 0.2. This happens when all three adopters receive bad signals.
In contrast, the promising product will be rejected by all the adopters with probability 0.25.
This happens when the first two adopters receive bad signals. Then, after observing two rejections, the third adopter will also reject the promising product regardless of his own private signal.
Our model can be applied to a firm's new product launch strategy. In this context, a firm considers launching a new product to many markets. Each market has a continuum of consumers with mass one. When the product is launched into a market, a signal is generated in this market. The signal could be a local advertising campaign or local critics' reviews. It is observable by all consumers in the local market but not in other markets. The adoption cost is the price which is fixed in all markets. The fixed-price assumption fits situations where a firm does not adjust price frequently. This may be because the price is regulated or the firm lacks the information, or it is too costly to do so. Examples include the motion picture and pharmaceutical markets.
In reality, some products were released simultaneously in all markets while others were Our theory can be used to explain different firms' launch strategies. In particular, we
show that the firm should launch the product sequentially when it is promising but not a sure winner. This is consistent with Bruce Snyder's comment and sheds some light on why many well-anticipated products are released sequentially even when a sequential launch involves a waiting cost and risks losing customers to its rivals.
Our model can also shed some light into sequential voting. It is well documented that in a primary election, whoever wins the first a few states is more likely to generate the momentum to win the nomination. Our model can be applied to a primary election in which a less well-known politician challenges a status quo. In this context, the adoption cost is the known quality of the status quo. Although the sequential order of a primary election is exogenous, our model can shed some light on what kind of less well-known politicians benefit from sequential voting.
Conclusion
We study a decision maker's product launch strategy when both the decision maker and adopters learn the value of the product from previous launches. When adopters' beliefs are extreme good or extremely bad, the decision maker cannot influence learning among adopters by manipulating the launch sequence, and therefore will launch the product simultaneous to all adopters or never launch it to any one, respectively.
When the adopters' beliefs are less extreme, the decision maker can control learning among adopters by manipulating the launch sequence. We find that when a product is promising, the decision maker will launch it sequentially even though many adopters would have adopted the product in a simultaneous launch. When a product is unpromising, the decision maker may launch it simultaneously to all the adopters even though very few of them will take the product in a simultaneous launch. Our results can be used to explain firms' new product launch strategy. We provide one explanation for why some well-anticipated products were released in a limited fashion.
We have predictions about the duration of a launch and the probability of triggering a rejection herd during the launch. The launch duration of a product is longer when the product is more likely to have a high value than when it is more likely to have a low value.
The decision maker will risk triggering a rejection herd when the product is promising. In contrast, he will not risk triggering a rejection herd when the product is unpromising.
APPENDIX
In the appendix G ≡ λq
. Let Pr(t|M ) denote the binomial distribution with parameters M , the number of independent experiments, and q, the probability of success. Let Pr(t ≥ T |M ) denote the multinomial distribution.
We first present three lemmas, Lemma 6 to Lemma 8, which will be used repeatedly in the remaining proofs.
Lemma 6. When the public belief is λ, with λ > , probability Pr(∆ 2k−1 ≥ 1) increases in
, probability Pr(∆ 2k−1 ≥ 1) decreases in k.
Proof.
Since q ∈ ( , probability Pr(∆ 2k ≥ 2) increases in k.
The difference
Since (
Lemma 8. When the public belief is λ, with λ < 1 2 , the term Pr(∆ 2k ≥ 2) + Pr(∆ 2k = 0)G decreases in k.
Substituting Pr(∆ 2k+2 ≥ 2)−Pr(∆ 2k ≥ 2)(See Lemma 7.) and Pr(∆ 2k = 0)−Pr(∆ 2k+2 = 0), the difference
Proof of Lemma 2
The proof is divided into 2 steps. The first step shows that it is never optimal for the decision maker to start a sequential launch with an odd number of adopters. The second step shows it is never optimal to launch the product sequentially.
Step 1. We show it is never optimal to launch the product to 2k + 1 adopters, with 2k + 1 < N , in the first period. We prove this by showing that the decision maker's expected payoff from launching the product to N adopters simultaneously is higher than when he launches the product to 2k + 1 adopters first.
The decision maker's expected payoff from launching the product to 2k + 1 adopters in the first period is
. By Lemma 6, we know Pr(∆ 2k+1 ≥ 1) decreases in n when λ < 1/2. Hence,
Step 2. We now show it is never optimal for the decision maker to launch the product in more than one period.
We prove this by contradiction.
Step 1 has shown that it is never optimal for the decision maker to start a sequential launch with an odd number of adopters. We can now focus on a sequential launch starting with an even number of adopters. Suppose the decision maker launches the product sequentially for T periods, T ≥ 2; he launches the product to n T adopters in period T, the last period, and n T −1 in period T − 1, the second to the last period. We show that the decision maker's payoff from launching the product to n T + n T −1 adopters in period T − 1 is greater than launching the product to n T −1 adopters in period T − 1 and n T adopters in period T .
as a consequence, the decision maker triggers a rejection herd.
The decision maker's expected payoff from launching the product to an even number of adopters 2k is
His expected payoff from launching the product to an odd number of adopters 2k + 1 is
The term
The difference π(n 1 = 2) − π(n 1 = 1) is
, the difference can be rewritten as
The expected equilibrium payoff v(λ, N − 2) is at least the payoff from a simultaneous
. Consequently,
Proof of Lemma 4
Lemma 4 is shown by induction.
1. We show when N = 2, n * (2, λ) = 1. The payoff from a simultaneous launch is π(n 1 = 2) = 2G. The payoff from launching the product to one adopter is
2. We propose that n * (N − 1, λ) = 1.
3. We show n * (N, λ) = 1.
The payoff from launching the product to one adopter is
When c < λ < min(λ, 1 2 ), the posterior belief after receiving a bad signal is λ L , where λ < λ L < min(c, 1 2 ). According to Lemma 2, v 
= GN + q(1 − q)(N − 1).
First, we show that n 1 = 1 is more profitable than n 1 = 2n + 1, for n = 1, 2, ..n max , with 2n + 1 ≤ N . ) and q ∈ (0.5, 1), (1 − 2λ)(Pr(t ≥ n + 1|2n + 1) − q) > 0. Hence π(n 1 = 1) − π(n 1 = 2n + 1) > q(1 − q)(N − 1) − C n 2n+1 q n+1 (1 − q) n+1 (N − 2n − 1) = q(1 − q)(N − 2n − 1)(
The term C n 2n+1 q n (1 − q) n ) is equal to 2n+1 n+1
Pr(t = n|2n, q) which is less than 2Pr(t = n|2n, q). Since Pr(t = n|2n, q) decreases in n, Pr(t = n|2n, q) ≤ 2q(1 − q). Accordingly, C n 2n+1 q n (1 − q) n < 4q(1 − q) < 1. Because We have shown in the proof of Lemma 2 that G(1 − Pr(∆ 2n = 0)) − Pr(∆ 2n ≥ 2) > 0.
The ratio
> 1 for n = 1, 2, ..., n max . The probability Pr(t = n|2n, q) decreases in n, which implies Pr(t = n|2n, q) ≤ 2q(1 − q) < 1. Therefore
− Pr(t = n|2n, q) > 0.
Consequently, π(n 1 = 1) − π(n 1 = 2n) > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5:
Consider that the decision maker launches the product to n adopters simultaneously, When the public belief is λ L and the number of the remaining adopters is N − 2k + 1, the decision maker can choose to launch the product to one adopter in the current period and follow the optimal strategy in the next period. Hence,
Because λ ∈ (0, 1) and q ∈ ( 
